

Local data doesn't stay local.

LexisNexis copies your city's police records into a private database that ICE, the FBI, the Navy, and hundreds of police departments pay to search. Victims and witnesses in your city have their most sensitive details opened to thousands of agencies, and nobody here can see who looked, or why.

Should our city hand sensitive police records to a private company that sells access to ICE and the military?

The players

LexisNexis Risk Solutions

A data broker owned by RELX, a British-Dutch publisher. Sells records on roughly 280 million U.S. adults to insurers, debt collectors, and government, ICE included.

Accurint

LexisNexis's people-search brand. ICE agents use it to find addresses, phones, vehicles, and relatives.

AVCC (Accurint Virtual Crime Center)

The platform your department subscribes to. Commercial records plus police records pooled from other agencies.

PSDEX (Public Safety Data Exchange)

The private database inside AVCC, built from records subscribing agencies upload. This is where your data goes.

Public Safety Marketplace

Add-ons in the same platform: facial recognition, commercial license plate data, social media monitoring. Enabled as features with a fee, without a separate contract.

How local police records become a federal search result

YOUR LOCAL POLICE DATA

RMS · CAD/911 · jail booking · online reports

Victim details and statements
Witness names and contact info
Home addresses and locations
Physical descriptions, race, age

911 caller identities
Arrest and booking records
Vehicles and plates
Records naming minors

Copied automatically, every hour

PRIVATE DATABASE

owned and operated by LexisNexis

Your records, pooled with those of 2,400+ other agencies, licensed to LexisNexis for free under terms that are **"irrevocable, worldwide" with the right to "transfer, transmit, publish and distribute" everything in them.**

Hundreds of local
police agencies

ICE, CBP, FBI, and
military subscribers

Accurint AI Insights
AI-driven investigations

What comes back to your city: no list of who searched your records, no notice, no audit.

"Widely utilized" for "the identification, location, arrest, and removal of noncitizens."

ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations director, on this system, June 2021

Who ends up in the database

The system does not discriminate. Sensitive details about everyone are copied and shared nationwide.



Crime victims
names, injuries,
statements



Witnesses
contact details,
what they saw



911 callers
even unfounded
ones



Helpers
bystanders who
stepped in



Minors
named in
reports and calls



Arrestees
charged or never
charged



Online filers
theft, fraud,
property reports

2,400+

police agencies feeding the
database (LexisNexis, 2026)

100M

agency-provided police records in
the database (LexisNexis)

\$24.5M

ICE spend on LexisNexis since
2021; 2026 deal feeds Palantir

1.2M

ICE searches on the platform in
seven months of 2021

What the city signs away

The city signs away its data rights in a contract file named the “AVCC XML Addendum.” Ask for it by name. Its terms:

Sec. I.2 “In exchange for good and valuable consideration, including access to PSDEX, Customer hereby agrees to contribute public safety information (the ‘Customer Data Contribution’)...”

Sec. II.1 “Customer, at no charge, hereby grants to LN a **paid up, irrevocable, worldwide, non-exclusive license** to use, adapt, compile, aggregate, create derivative works, transfer, transmit, publish and distribute the Customer Data Contributions...”

Sec. II.6 “Unless otherwise indicated by written request from Customer, **all data will be retained by LN and remain accessible by others...**”

Sec. I.4.b Customer is “**solely responsible for the content**” it uploads. LexisNexis disclaims responsibility for errors.

Risks to the city

The license is irrevocable

Cancel the contract and the copy stays unless you ask in writing. Products already built from your data stay too.

Federal access is the business model

ICE stated in 2021 that it buys LexisNexis access to get around local rules that stop agencies from sharing records with ICE directly.

You cannot audit how your data is used

The city loses sight of, and accountability over, how its records are used, copied, and distributed. LexisNexis owes you no log of who queried them.

Residents cannot opt out

Citizens, even in states with strict privacy laws, cannot opt out. LexisNexis does not suppress anyone’s records from its law enforcement products.

Accuracy creates local liability

The city is “solely responsible for the content” it uploads. A wrong name in one report becomes a wrong name in 2,400 agencies’ search results.

Ways to keep control

Stop sharing



Sign the “NO DATA CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSDEX” version of the addendum. Officers keep full search access. Duluth did this in 2020.

Keep it local



If you share, require a Sub-Agency Addendum limiting distribution to named members of your regional consortium, as Oklahoma City did.

Create accountability



Make an annual report of who accessed your records, and how often, a contract term, and publish it.

Conduct a data privacy review



Weigh what the department gets from the pool against the liability of handing records to a company that offers no visibility into their use.

Block marketplace end-arounds



Any added LexisNexis surveillance application from the Public Safety Marketplace gets a council vote after public comment.

For police leadership

Your department holds the most sensitive records a city keeps: who was hurt, who witnessed it, who called 911, and where they live. Licensing that data to a company that sells access to agencies with different missions, values, and priorities, with no way for you to see who accessed it or how it was used, is a choice you make on behalf of the city and every person in your

CAD, RMS, and JMS systems. Their privacy and safety belong on the scale next to the search tool.

The access is not speculative. ICE has paid LexisNexis about \$24.5 million since 2021, its 2026 contract requires the data to feed Palantir, and LexisNexis’s own sales deck lists ICE, the FBI, and the U.S. Navy as customers.

Questions to ask before you vote

- Does quietly sharing local police data with federal agencies build public trust in our police, or erase it?
- Was this council told that the subscription lets a private company copy our police records and sell access to them?
- Would residents still call 911 if the call ends up in a federal database? What does that chilling effect cost public safety?
- How many local records have we shared with LexisNexis, and who has accessed them?
- Does sharing victim, witness, and minor data expose the city to litigation over privacy, a breach, or a deportation? Is that risk worth the reward?
- Are victims, witnesses, and minors in our feed today?

FinePrint

Public interest research on surveillance, public safety, and digital rights. Is your agency on the list? accurintfiles.fineprint.report
fineprint.report · September 2026 · Free to share.

1 AVCC XML Addendum, LexisNexis form Q4.19.v1, executed 2022 (Virginia public record); same language in CA, CO, IL, MN, WA contracts.
2 LexisNexis AVCC sales presentation, 2026; LexisNexis marketing (100M records).

3 ICE contract 70CMSD21C00000001 (USASpending.gov); ICE notice of intent, Aug. 10, 2026, via 404 Media.
4 ICE records via Just Futures Law and The Intercept, June 2022.

5 ICE Justification J&A-21-00148, June 2021.
6 LexisNexis consumer opt-out policy.
7 Duluth Resolution 20-0345R (2020); Oklahoma City council records.